

# Post Memory Corruption Memory Analysis

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**black hat**

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*IT serenity*

# Who am I ?

(a bit of self promotion ;)

- Security Research Engineer, CEO @ Toucan System (French Company).
- Known online as endrazine (irc, twitter...)
- Met some of you on irc.
- Currently lives in Sydney (pentester for CBA).
- Speaker at several conferences :  
Defcon/HITB/HES/Ruxcon/h2hc...
- Organiser of the Hackito Ergo Sum conference (Paris).

# I don't reverse plain text

I don't SQL inject

I don't PHP include


I don't Coldfusion

I don't .NET

I don't XSRF



\*sigh\*



# Agenda

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 **A few basics**

 **Being environment aware**

 **PMCMA Design**

 **Extending Pmcma**

 **• Stack desynchronization**

# What's pmcma ?

It's a debugger, for Linux (maybe one day \*NIX) ptrace() based.

Pmcma allows to find and test **exploitation scenarios**.

Pmcma's output is a roadmap to exploitation, not exploit code.

Tells you if a given bug triggering an **invalid memory access** is a vulnerability, if it is exploitable with the state of the art, and how to exploit it.

What's pmcma ?

DEMO

Tool available on September 1<sup>st</sup> 2011 at  
<http://www.pmcma.org>

# **A FEW BASICS**



# How do applications crash ?

- \* Stack corruptions -> stack overflows, usually now detected because of SSP | studied a LOT
- \* Signal 6 -> assert(), abort(): unexpected execution paths (assert() in particular), heap corruptions
- \* Segfault (Signal 11) -> Invalid memory access

# Invalid memory access

- trying to **read** a page not readable.  
often not mapped at all.
- trying to **write** to a page not writable.  
often not mapped at all.
- trying to **execute** a page not  
executable. often not mapped at all.

# Why do they happen ?

Because of any kind of miscomputation, really :

- integer overflows in loop counters or destination registers when copying/initializing data, casting errors when extending registers or
- uninitialised memory, dangling pointers
- variable misuse
- heap overflows (when inadvertently overwriting a function ptr)
- missing format strings
- overflows in heap, .data, .bss, or any other writable section (including shared libraries).
- stack overflows when no stack cookies are present...

# Exploiting invalid exec

Trivial, really. Eg :

```
call eax
```

with eax fully user controled

# Invalid memory reads (1/2)

Eg :

CVE-2011-0761 (Perl)

```
cmp    BYTE PTR [ebx+0x8],0x9
```

# Invalid memory reads (2/2)

Eg :

CVE-2011-0764 (t1lib)

```
fld    QWORD PTR [eax+0x8]
```

# Exploiting invalid memory reads ?

- usually plain not exploitable
- won't allow us to modify the memory of the mapping directly
- in theory : we could perform a user controlled read, to trigger a second (better) bug.

# Invalid memory writes

Eg :

CVE-2011-1824 (Opera)

```
mov    DWORD PTR [ebx+edx*1],eax
```



# How to...

To exploit invalid writes, we need to find ways to transform an arbitrary write into an arbitrary exec.

The most obvious targets are function pointers.

# Exploiting invalid memory writes : scenario

- Target a known function pointer (typically : .dtors, GOT entry...).

Can be prevented at compile time :  
no .dtors, static GOT...

- Target function pointers in the whole binary ?
- Overwrite a given location to trigger an other bug (eg : stack overflow)

**Being environment aware**

# Problems to take into account

- Kernel : ASLR ? NX ?
- Compilation/linking : RELRO (partial/full) ? no .ctors section ? SSP ? FORTIFY\_SOURCE ?

=> Pmcma needs to measure/detect those features

# ASLR

Major problem when choosing an exploitation strategy.

# ASLR : not perfect

- Prelinking (default on Fedora) breaks ASLR
- All kernels don't have the same randomization strength.
- Non PIE binaries

=> Truth is : we need better tools to test it !

# Testing ASLR

- Run a binary X times (say X=100)
  - Stop execution after loading
- Record mappings.

=> Compare mappings, deduce randomization

DEMO : being environment aware



# PMCMA DESIGN

# GOALS

- We want to test overwriting different memory locations inside a process and see if they have an influence over the flow of execution
- We want to scale to big applications (web browsers, network daemons...)
- We want a decent execution time

# mk\_fork()

The idea :

- We start analysing after a SEGFAULT
- We make the process fork() (many many times)
- Inside each offspring, we overwrite a different memory location

# mk\_fork() : benefits

Mapping looks « just like » it will when actually exploiting a binary

No ASLR/mapping replication problem

Exhaustive and hopefully fast

# How to force a process to fork ?

- 1) Find a +X location mapped in memory.
- 2) Save registers
- 3) Use ptrace() to inject fork() shellcode.
- 4) Modify registers so eip points to shellcode.
- 5) Execute shellcode.
- 6) Wait() for both original process and offspring.
- 7) Restore bytes in both processes.
- 8) Restore registers in both processes.


# Forking shellcode

;forking shellcode:


00000000	6631C0	xor eax,eax
00000003	B002	mov al,0x2
00000005	CD80	int 0x80

# mk\_fork()



Original process



Offspring 1



Offspring 2



# mk\_fork()

Offspring 1

Executable

Writable

Executable

...



# mk\_fork()

Offspring 2

Executable

writable

Executable

...

# mk\_fork()

Offspring n

Executable

Writable

Executable

...

# mk\_fork() : PROS

- allows for multiple tests out of a single process
- fast, efficient (no recording of memory snapshots)
- no need to use breakpoints
- no single stepping

# mk\_fork() : CONS

- Dealing with offsprings termination ?  
(Zombie processes)
- I/O, IPC, network sockets will be in unpredictable state
- Hence syscalls will get wrong too (!!)

# Zombie reaping

- Avoid the `wait()` for a `SIGCHLD` in the parent process.
- Kill processes after a given timeout, including all of their children.

# Zombie reaping : the SIGCHLD problem

If we can have the parent process ignore SIGCHLD signals, we won't create Zombies.

=> We inject a small shellcode to perform this via sigaction()

# Zombie reaping : the SIGCHLD problem

- 1) Find a +X location mapped in memory.
- 2) Save registers
- 3) Use ptrace() to inject sigaction() shellcode.
- 4) Modify registers so eip points to shellcode.
- 5) Execute shellcode.
- 6) Wait() for the process while executing shellcode.
- 7) Restore bytes in +X location.
- 8) Restore registers in the process.





Zombie reaping : killing  
the offsprings and their  
children

Fortunately, this is possible using  
« process grouping »...

# Process grouping

`setpgid()` sets the PGID of the process specified by `pid` to `pgid`. If `pid` is zero, then the process ID of the calling process is used. If `pgid` is zero, then the PGID of the process specified by `pid` is made the same as its process ID. If `setpgid()` is used to move a process from one process group to another (as is done by some shells when creating pipelines), both process groups must be part of the same session (see `setsid(2)` and `credentials(7)`). In this case, the `pgid` specifies an existing process group to be joined and the session ID of that group must match the session ID of the joining process.

# Zombie reaping : forcing process grouping

- 1) Find a +X location mapped in memory.
- 2) Save registers
- 3) Use ptrace() to inject setpgid() shellcode.
- 4) Modify registers so eip points to shellcode.
- 5) Execute shellcode.
- 6) Wait() for the process while executing shellcode.
- 7) Restore bytes in +X location.
- 8) Restore registers in the process.

# Force process grouping...

```
;  
; setpgid(0,0); shellcode  
;
```

```
_start:  
  nop  
  nop  
  nop  
  nop  
  mov eax,0x39 ; setpgid  
  xor ebx,ebx  
  xor ecx,ecx  
  int 0x80  
  
  db 0xcc, 0xcc
```

# Zombie reaping : final details

From now on, to kill a process and all of  
its children :

`kill (-pid, SIGTERM) ;`

# IPC, I/O, invalid syscalls

One possibility is to recode correct execution on the original process (after clearing signals and ignoring the SEGFAULT).

Then replay/fake the syscalls on the offsprings.

=> Minimal userland « virtualization ».

# **PMcMA : FEATURES**

# Exploiting invalid memory writes via function pointers

We now want to find all the function pointers called by the application from the instruction which triggered the SEGFAULT until it actually halts.

(including pointers in shared libraries!!)



# Finding all the function pointers actually called

- 1) Parse all the +W memory, look for possible pointers to any section
  - 1 bis) optionally disassemble the destination and see if it is a proper prologue.
- 2) use `mk_fork()` to create many children
- 3) in each children, overwrite a different possible function pointer with a canari value (0xf1f2f3f4).
- 4) Monitor execution of the offsprings

Finding all the function  
pointers actually called

Overwritten pointer leads to execution of  
canari address 0xf1f2f3f4

<=> We found a called function pointer.

Finding all the function  
pointers actually called

DEMO

# So what can we test now ?

**Invalid write anything anywhere :**

attacker has full control over data  
written and destination where written

**=> GAME OVER**

So what can we test now ?

**Overflows** (in any writable section but  
the stack) :  
Simply limit the results of pmcma to  
this section.

So what can we test now ?

What if the attacker has little or **no control over the data being written** (arbitrary write non controlled data, anywhere) ?

# Partial overwrites and pointers truncation

If we can't properly overwrite a function pointer, maybe we can still **truncate** one (with the data we don't control) so that it transfers execution to a controlled memory zone ?

# Exemple :

--[ Function pointers exploitable by truncation with 0x41424344:

At 0xb70ce070 : 0xb70c63c2 will become 0xb70c4142 (lower truncated by 16 bits, dest perms:RW)

At 0xb70e40a4 : 0xb70ca8f2 will become 0xb70c4142 (lower truncated by 16 bits, dest perms:RW)

At 0xb70ec080 : 0xb70e5e02 will become 0xb70e4142 (lower truncated by 16 bits, dest perms:RW)

At 0xb731a030 : 0xb7315da2 will become 0xb7314142 (lower truncated by 16 bits, dest perms:RW)

At 0xb73230a4 : 0xb732003a will become 0xb7324142 (lower truncated by 16 bits, dest perms:RW)

At 0xb732803c : 0xb7325a36 will become 0xb7324142 (lower truncated by 16 bits, dest perms:RW)

At 0xb76a80d8 : 0xb7325bf0 will become 0xb7324142 (lower truncated by 16 bits, dest perms:RW)



# One more situation...

Sometimes, an attacker has limited control over the destination of the write (wether he controls the data being written or not).

Eg : 4b aligned memory writes.

# Exploiting 4b aligned memory writes

We can't attack a function pointer directly, unless it is unaligned (rare because of compiler internals).

Pmcma will still let you know if this happens ;)

# Exploiting 4b aligned memory writes : plan B

Find all « normal » variables we can  
overwrite/truncate, and attempt to  
trigger a second bug because of this  
overwrite.

# Finding all unaligned memory accesses

Setting the **unaligned flag** in the EFLAGS register will trigger a signal 7 upon next access of unaligned memory (read/write).

# Finding all unaligned memory accesses

DEMO

# Finding all unaligned memory accesses

DEMO x86\_64

# Defeating ASLR : Automated memory mapping leakage

How does WTFuzz did it at CansecWest 2010 to win the pwn2own contest against IE8/Windows 7 ?

Overwrite the null terminator of a JS string to perform a mem leak uppon usage (trailing bytes).

# Defeating ASLR with an arbitrary write ?

In the original process :

- use `ptrace()` `PTRACE_SYSCALL`
- record the calls to `sys_write()` and `sys_socketcall()` (wrapper to `sys_send()` or `sys_sendto()`...), including : where is the data sent ? How many bytes ?



# Defeating ASLR with an arbitrary write ?

Create many offsprings using `mk_fork()`.

- In each of them : overwrite a different location with dummy data.
- Follow execution using `PTRACE_SYSCALL`
- Monitor differences : a different address or a bigger size means a memory leak :)

# Extending Pmcma

Means of modifying the  
flow of execution without  
function pointers

Call tables.


Calling [Offset+register]

=> This is also already performed  
automatically using pmcma.

# Pointers and ASLR

If overwriting a given function pointer isn't practical because of ASLR : is it possible to overwrite a pointer (in an other section) to a structure containing this function pointer ?  
Would this « other section » be less randomised ?

# Finding pointers to structures containing function pointers



# Finding pointers to structures containing function pointers

We'd like to have the debugged process create a new section, with a given mapping (to ease identify).

Modify a possible pointer per offspring (use `mk_fork()`).

Monitor execution : is the offspring calling a function pointer from our custom mapping ?

# Forcing a process to create a new mapping :

- 1) Find a +X location mapped in memory.
- 2) Save registers
- 3) Use ptrace() to inject mmap() shellcode.
- 4) Modify registers so eip points to shellcode.
- 5) Execute shellcode.
- 6) Wait() for the process while executing shellcode.
- 7) Restore bytes in +X location.
- 8) Restore registers in the process.

```
;
; old_mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED|MAP_ANONYMOUS, 0, 0) shellcode:
;
```

```
_start:
```

```
    nop
    nop
    nop
    nop
```

```
    xor eax, eax
    xor ebx, ebx
    xor ecx, ecx
    xor edx, edx
    xor esi, esi
    xor edi, edi
```

```
    mov bx, 0x1000          ; 1 page
    mov cl, 0x3            ; PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE
    mov dl, 0x21          ; MAP_SHARED|MAP_ANON
```

```
    push eax
    push eax
    push edx
    push ecx
    push ebx
    push eax
```

```
    mov ebx, esp
    mov al, 0x5a          ; sys_mmap
    int 0x80
```

```
; eax contains address of new mapping
```

```
db 0xcc, 0xcc, 0xcc, 0xcc
```



# Testing exhaustively arbitrary writes

In case all of the above failed...

Can we trigger secondary bugs by  
overwriting specific memory  
locations ?

# Testing exhaustively arbitrary writes

Complexity is huge !

Still doable with Pmcma, with no guaranty over the time of execution.

# Testing exhaustively arbitrary reads

In the same vein, attacker controlled invalid reads can trigger secondary bugs, which will be exploitable.

=> We can test the whole 4+ billions search space (under x86 Intel architecture), or just a few evenly chosen ones.

# Stack desynchronization

W^X is a problem.

Even if we can overwrite fully a function pointer and modify the flow of execution... what do we want to execute in 2011 ?

# Stack desynchronization

Instead of returning directly to shellcode in +W section (hence probably not +X) :

- Return to a function epilogue chosen so that esp will be set to user controlled data in the stack.
- Fake stack frames in the stack itself.
- Use your favorite ROP/ret2plt shellcode

# Stack desynchronization :

## Exemple : sudo

- stack is ~1000 big (at analysis time)
- we find a function pointer to overwrite (at 0x0806700c)
- we overwrite it with a carefully chosen prologue (inc esp by more than 1000)

# Stack desynchronization : Exemple : sudo

```
jonathan@blackbox:~$ objdump -Intel -d  
/usr/bin/sudo
```

```
...
```

```
805277a:    81 c4 20 20 00 00    add esp,0x2020  
8052780:    5b                  pop    ebx  
8052781:    5e                  pop    esi  
8052782:    5d                  pop    ebp  
8052783:    c3                  ret
```

# Stack desynchronization : Exemple : sudo

We can control the destination where  
esp is going to point : simply use an  
environment variable

```
TOTO=mydata sudo
```



# Stack desynchronization :

## Exemple : sudo

We then forge fake stack frames in the stack itself

- « Nop sled » : any pointer to 'ret'

Eg :804997b: c3 ret

- Then copy shellcode to .bss byte per byte using memcpy via ret2plt
- Use GOT overwrite to get pointer to mprotect() in the GOT (ROP)
- call mprotect to make .bss +X via ret2plt
- return to shellcode in .bss



DEMOS

# Future Work

- port to more architectures (Linux x86\_64 on the way, arm...)
- port to more OS (Mac OSX, \*BSD)
- port to Windows (hard)
- add tests for other bug classes

# Thank you for coming

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## Questions ?

